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Abstract
Continental philosophy has maintained an abiding interest in transcendence; however, that 
interest has been shaped by the geographical, historical, and cultural milieu in which con-
tinental philosophy developed. But today “continental” philosophy is pursued beyond the 
boundaries of continental Europe, and it behooves us to ask what might be contributed to 
phenomenological and hermeneutic accounts of transcendence by traditions rooted in other 
places, other continents. Some of the first distinctive philosophical contributions of North 
America—“philosophical” in the sense that term is used in “Western” philosophy—are to 
be found in the works of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau. Thoreau, in 
particular, gave voice to a very different view of transcendence. Thoreau and those thinking 
in his wake—Henry Bugbee, Annie Dillard, and others—think transcendence in terms of 
nature, particularly wilderness, in terms of contact, and in terms of wandering or itinerancy. 
Here transcendence is less about trans-ascendance and its focus on another world, and more 
about a mode of living deeply in this world.
Keywords: Immanence, transcendence, wilderness, abstraction, Henry David Thoreau, 
Henry Bugbee, Annie Dillard
Within me, even the most metaphysical problem takes on a warm physical 
body which smells of sea, soil, and human sweat. The Word, in order to 
touch me, must become warm flesh. Only then do I understand—when I 
can smell, see, and touch.1
Nikos Kazantzakis, Report to Greco
1  Nikos Kazantzakis, Report to Greco, trans. P.E. Bien (New York: Touchstone, 1965), 
43.
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The holiness of the real  
Is always there, accessible  
In total immanence.2 
Kenneth Rexroth, “Time Is The Mercy of Eternity”
Continental philosophy has long been concerned with the question of transcendence, a fact attributable in part to the historical significance of 
phenomenology and the legacy of debates surrounding transcendental ide-
alism, the epoche, the status of the world and of other people, and, at least for 
some philosophers, the question of God. The question takes different forms 
in Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Levinas, Derrida, Marion, 
and others working in this tradition, but it remains an abiding concern for 
each of them. Over time the persistence of this issue has formed a body of 
work that constitutes a kind of center of gravity—one among several—that 
characterizes continental thinking. 
However, as with any gravitational body, the question of transcendence 
tends to attract satellites that follow relatively predictable orbits. For exam-
ple, one persistent focus in continental accounts of transcendence is the 
question of how the other, as other, can appear to us, which is taken up in 
Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations, Levinas’s Totality and Infinity, and elsewhere. 
This concern with appearance is, again, no doubt a function of the legacy 
of phenomenology. A second characteristic of continental accounts is the 
tendency to think of otherness primarily in the form of persons, whether 
human or divine. The concern with persons is certainly a function, not of 
phenomenology, but rather of the Judeo-Christian milieu in which continen-
tal European philosophy developed. Neither of these foci—how the other 
appears, or the tendency to focus on the otherness of persons—can be said 
to be universal in continental thinking, but they are, broadly speaking, char-
acteristic of the way in which we have come to think about transcendence. 
However, both of these emphases are traceable to a context or environ-
ment that is, we must concede, contingent. The scope of continental philoso-
phy is still influenced by what I have characterized as the gravitational pull 
of a single continent, Europe, and that during a rather narrow timeframe, 
the latter half of the 20th century. This is not to dismiss, in any way, the 
significance of the thought that arose in that time and in that place, much 
of which is undeniably profound. Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, 
Levinas, Serres, Marion, and similar figures are read because they are bril-
liant and insightful, not because they happen to be European.3 Rather, it is to 
2  Kenneth Rexroth, “Time Is The Mercy of Eternity” in The Sierra Mountain Writings, ed. 
Kim Stanley Robinson (New York: New Directions, 1944), 76.
3  Or because they happen to be male, French, German, heterosexual, and so forth. 
Nevertheless, the argument that continental philosophy is enriched by a conscious attempt 
to play continental (European) philosophy in the key of  different places (North American, 
the West, Asia, Africa, New Zealand, etc., etc.), could be made equally well for the need to 
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recognize—with hermeneutics, another core continental development—that 
context matters, and that every thinker, caught up in the hermeneutic circle, 
is in some measure a reflection of his or her time and place. But if this is 
true, what is the significance of the fact that the 20th century is no longer our 
time? And the fact that, for many “continental” philosophers, Europe is not 
our native place? What we think of as the core of continental philosophy 
bears the mark of World War I and the Lost Generation, of World War II 
and the Shoah, and of the Cold War and the threat of nuclear annihilation; 
but new phenomena and experiences mark our time, and characterize our 
dwelling in our own places.4
In the interests of expanding the scope of reflection on transcendence in 
continental philosophy, in what follows I want to think about what might 
be contributed to our thinking from a different continent. And since I do 
not presume to speak from all traditions, times, places, I’ll bracket for the 
moment any attempt to address a different tradition (e.g., Buddhist) or time 
(e.g., by limiting myself to contemporary thinkers), and concentrate on 
reflecting on what might be contributed by thinking from a different place: 
North America. Nevertheless, as I don’t mean to sever my reflections from 
the springs of continental philosophy, my references will draw from both 
sides of the Atlantic. As Ralph Waldo Emerson noted in his famous oration, 
“The American Scholar,” in seeking to make genuine and distinctive contri-
butions to philosophy or literature, one must both serve an apprenticeship 
to “the past,” learning what truths it has to teach, and be deeply attuned to 
“nature,” the concrete particulars of one’s own place in the world.5
The strand of American philosophy I want to develop—there are cer-
tainly others6—is relevant for thinking about transcendence in continental 
include other kinds of otherness in the “continental” canon. Again, this is not to endorse 
relativism by suggesting that all approaches and expressions are equal. Additionally, I cannot 
emphasize strongly enough, given recent political developments in my own country, that 
my concern here has nothing to do with a blustering nativism. If Thoreau should be read 
by continental philosophers, it should be because his contribution is both (i) novel (i.e., not 
part of the same milieu as the continental canon) and (ii) brilliant or insightful. The former, 
lacking the latter, is not worth sustained attention during a limited life. But the latter, lacking 
the former, runs the risk of staleness at least and myopia at worst.
4  Thus, I hope to problematize the concept of “continental” philosophy insofar as that 
term has generally come to mean continental European philosophy. Surely if we took phe-
nomenological method or hermeneutic awareness and planted either in the soil of Sri Lanka 
or Shanghai, the themes, emphases, and foci they developed would differ in meaningful 
ways from those same traditions as developed on the continent of Europe. Put otherwise, 
it is perhaps time philosophers began to think about “continental” philosophy (phenome-
nology, hermeneutics) beyond “the” continent (Europe).
5  Ralph Waldo Emerson, “The American Scholar” in Ralph Waldo Emerson: Essays and 
Lectures (New York: The Library of America, 1983), 53-71.
6  Thus, “American” philosophy, including the version of it I pursue here, is just as 
problematic as “continental” philosophy. I think there is good reason to think of the tra-
dition and style of thinking I develop in this essay, a tradition associated with the ideas of 
wilderness, is distinctively American and emblematic of the American character. However, 
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philosophy both because it shares traits with more traditional continental 
thought and because contributes something new to the conversation. The 
shared traits facilitate communication between different thinkers, while 
the novel or divergent traits insure that there is something worthwhile 
to talk about. My claim—that transcendence is always found and expe-
rienced in and through immanence—is hardly original; it is expressed in 
various forms by thinkers including Nietzsche, Proust, Woolf, and others. 
Nevertheless, by cleaving close to the work of American thinkers like 
Henry David Thoreau and Henry Bugbee, I hope to develop a particular 
expression of that insight: that nature, and particularly wilderness, offers 
us a mode of access to transcendence that is generally underappreciated 
in continental philosophy. 
I. Thinking Poetically 
There are, of course, multiple avenues through which we might inquire 
into the character of American continental philosophy; but a convenient 
place to begin can be found in the work of Henry Bugbee. Other American 
thinkers—Emerson, Thoreau, et al.—share some of Bugbee’s sensibilities 
and insights, but Bugbee provides a useful point of contact with continental 
European philosophy insofar as he was engaged more explicitly in dialogue 
with Gabriel Marcel and others.7
Bugbee spent the greater part of his professional life teaching in Montana, 
after being denied tenure at Harvard on the basis of insufficient publication, 
a problem greatly exacerbated by the fact that Bugbee’s own brand of “expe-
riential reflection” was alien to the academic standards of the institution.8 
Insufficient quantity of publication was the stated cause for his termination—
Bugbee was very well liked at Harvard, and W.V.O. Quine described him as 
it is not uniquely so. If, as Wallace Stegner claims, the frontier and the West shaped the 
American character and as a consequence American literature and philosophy, the same 
could be said with equal validity of, for example, the African-American experience, history, 
and narrative (slavery, the Civil War, the civil rights movement, etc.). There are various 
other examples.
7  Of course Thoreau and, to an even greater extent, Emerson were also influenced by 
European thought; but, following the spirit of Emerson’s “The American Scholar,” they 
were both also self-consciously engaged with an attempt to develop distinctively American 
philosophical expressions. Thoreau was also particularly influenced by South Asian phil-
osophical and religious thinking, at least insofar as it was available to him; and this also 
moderated the influence of the dominant European traditions of his culture. Despite “The 
American Scholar,” Emerson was still very much an intellectual in the European mode, or 
at least an image of it. Thoreau, however, was something altogether sui generis.
8  See Henry Bugbee, Wilderness in America: Philosophical Writings, ed. David W. Rodick 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2017), 3. Also see, as the most characteristic example 
of that “experiential reflection,” Henry Bugbee, The Inward Morning (Athens, GA: University 
of Georgia Press, 1999).
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“the ultimate exemplar of the examined life”9—but the style of his thinking 
and writing were undoubtedly contributing factors to the leisurely pro-
duction and mixed reception of his work. Bugbee’s major work, The Inward 
Morning (completed after he left Harvard), is a meditative reflection that 
reads like a crossing of Marcel’s Metaphysical Journal and Thoreau’s Walden; 
it bore little resemblance to the ordered arguments and logical style that 
were even then coming to dominate the academy. Bugbee’s work does not 
frame itself as a dispute, nor does it drive for closure. As such, it echoes the 
style of The Embers and the Stars—written by the Czech philosopher Erazim 
Kohák while he was teaching at Boston University and living in an isolated 
cabin in New Hampshire—which the author warns us does “not [seek] to 
‘prove a point’ but to evoke and share a vision,” his primary too is “the 
metaphor, not the argument,” and the end result is “not a doctrine but an 
invitation to look and see.”10 Bugbee believed that while we can experience 
and reflect upon existential truth, it is not comprehensible in the sense that 
we cannot “attain any kind of permanent hold upon it.”11 We can come to 
understand it more fully and more deeply, but we cannot fix it with preci-
sion. Consequently, he came to recognize that, for him, the best philosophy 
was in the end “an approximation to the poem.”12
In his celebrated Senses of Walden, Stanley Cavell asks, “Why has America 
never expressed itself philosophically?”13 The question is, of course, ironic 
because Cavell believes that America has expressed itself philosophically, 
and has done so in a particularly American idiom. 
In looking for “American” philosophy, one might be inclined to point 
to Pragmatism, and not without reason. While Peirce, James, and Dewey 
were in dialogue with European philosophy they were certainly original 
thinkers. And the emphasis on the “use” or “cash-value” of ideas does 
seem to resonate with one stereotypical image of the American character. 
Fair enough. But a generation or more before the rise and influence of 
pragmatism Emerson, Thoreau, and the Transcendentalists were at work. 
The difficulty is that, especially in the modern academy, Emerson and 
Thoreau do not really appear philosophical. The environment that made 
Harvard so unworkable for Bugbee, despite the goodwill of his friends—an 
environment that treats philosophy as a kind of “all-purpose solvent” for 
solving an increasingly narrow set of problems, and demands “correct, 
9  Bugbee, Wilderness in America, 2.
10  Erazim Kohák, The Embers and the Stars (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1984), xiii. 
11  Henry Bugbee, The Inward Morning (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1999), 30.
12  Bugbee, Inward Morning, 33. I take this to be a result of a quasi-hermeneutic recogni-
tion that the truths with which we are here concerned are ones that we speak of in ways 
that are, at best, indirect and approximate. A kind of “theo-poetics,” to use the terminology 
recently adopted by Jack Caputo. See John D. Caputo, The Insistence of God (Bloomington, 
IN: Indiana University Press, 2013).
13  Stanley Cavell, The Senses of Walden (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 33.
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scientific, abstract, hygienically pallid”14 expression—is precisely one that 
cannot recognize the philosophical contributions of thinkers like Thoreau 
and Bugbee. And this, I’d suggest, applies to a wide variety of American 
philosophical figures. Thoreau is more often studied in English departments 
than in departments of philosophy, despite the clearly philosophical nature 
of his reflections. Bugbee’s meditative journal is forgotten by all but a small 
core of admirers, despite the fact that they record the reflections of some-
one more or less universally viewed as wise by his colleagues from diverse 
philosophical traditions. Cornel West’s contributions are marginalized not 
only by the fact that he is an African-American intellectual, but by the fact 
that he stubbornly refuses to conform to a narrow scholarly paradigm. A list 
of American philosophers marginalized by the American academy would 
be long, and would include many distinguished figures. 
Theoretically, however, continental philosophy—with its emphases on 
perspective and context, and its acceptance of indirect, elliptical, even poetic 
expression—should be more open to engaging figures whose work defies 
standard academic categories.15 I’ve already noted that Bugbee’s Inward 
Morning closely resembles Marcel’s Metaphysical Journal. But a tradition 
that embraces the eccentricity of Circumfession and Eyes, or the sweeping 
scope of The Five Senses and A Thousand Plateaus, should have little problem 
with the idea that valuable philosophical truths might be expressed other-
wise than syllogism or abstraction.16 A stylistically diverse, meditative, and 
open-ended style of philosophy is the first characteristic I want to associate 
with the stream of American philosophy I’m engaging here; and this is a 
characteristic it shares with some of the best work in continental philosophy 
as traditionally conceived.
14  Martha Nussbaum, complaining about the rigid confines of the analytic philosoph-
ical community in which she found herself as a young academic—appropriately enough, 
at Harvard. See Martha Nussbaum, “Form and Content” in Love’s Knowledge: Essays on 
Philosophy and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 19. 
15  Certainly analytic philosophy has its own particular value and virtue; and I have learned 
and continue to learn a great deal from reading analytic philosophy and engaging my analytic 
colleagues. So the emphasis on continental thought here is not intended to be dismissive of the 
analytic tradition as a whole. However, because analytic philosophy is pursued in a manner 
that tends to emphasize abstraction and disinterested rationality, it also tends to downplay 
the significance of history, language, culture, and place. In a word: context. It matters little 
whether analytic philosophy is pursued in Oxford or Oklahoma, since disinterested reason 
functions similarly in either locale. Therefore, there is in principle nothing distinctive about 
American analytic philosophy. The same cannot be true for continental—that is, phenome-
nological and hermeneutic—philosophy, or at least that is my wager.  
16  Circumfession is part of Geoffrey Bennington and Jacques Derrida, Jacques Derrida, 
trans. Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993). Michel Serres, 
Eyes, trans. Anne Marie Feeberg-Dibon (London: Bloomsbury, 2015). Michel Serres, The Five 
Senses: A Philosophy of Mingled Bodies, trans. Margaret Sankey and Peter Cowley (London: 
Continuum, 2008). Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans Brian 
Massumi (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota, 1987).
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II. Thinking Concretely
A second distinctive characteristic of this form of American philosophy—
one that it also shares with key figures in the continental tradition, and one 
that bears on the issue of transcendence—is its allergy to abstraction. Or, 
stated otherwise, a commitment to a kind of immanence. Thoreau, Bugbee, 
and others of their ilk are deeply rooted in the concrete—everyday experi-
ences of the carnal body in the material world.17 
Abstraction is the process by which we take an element of reality and 
separate it from the whole in order to study it. This happens, for example, 
when I view a young person in one of my classes qua student, or when a 
land manager looks at an environment in terms of resource extraction. In 
instances like these, the abstraction helps us to focus on something useful 
or important and to learn about it. However, while abstraction is not mis-
leading per se it can metamorphose, eventually succumbing to what Gabriel 
Marcel calls the “spirit of abstraction.”18 The spirit of abstraction takes hold 
when we forget that abstraction is abstraction: when we begin to think of 
the abstraction as the truth, or when we mistake the part on which we have 
focused for the whole from which it was abstracted. 
As Marcel says, “it can happen that the mind, yielding to a sort of fasci-
nation, ceases to be aware of these prior conditions that justify abstraction 
and deceives itself about the nature of what is, in itself, nothing more than 
a method.”19 The power of abstraction lies in its ability to help us to under-
stand—more precisely, with greater detail, and so forth—due to the focus 
that it allows. However, abstractions can lead to their own misunderstand-
ings, missing the forest for focus on the trees, and at worst becoming “a 
violent attack directed against a sort of integrity of the real.”20 Abstraction 
is a powerful tool or step in the process of understanding; but the origi-
nal unity of experience must be recouped by what Marcel calls a “second 
reflection,” which reinserts, as it were, the abstraction into the whole that 
is its natural environment and within which it has meaning.
Abstraction has become common in many philosophical enterprises, and 
this is no less the case in our thinking about transcendence. In his Gifford 
Lectures, Marcel insists that whatever we mean by “transcendence” we 
cannot mean “transcending experience.” Understanding the experience of 
transcendence may be fraught with all kinds of difficulties; and it may be 
17  The Inward Morning covers a great deal of ground for such a short book, but Bugbee 
insists that one of his major tasks was overcoming abstraction (Bugbee, The Inward Morning, 
10.). An allergy to abstraction is also evident in the other major American philosophical 
innovation: pragmatism (William James, John Dewey, Cornel West).
18  Gabriel Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, trans. G.S. Fraser (Chicago: Henry Regnery 
Company, 1967), 155 ff.
19  Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, 155.
20  Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, 156.
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that such experiences approach ineffability—which is precisely why talk 
of genuine transcendence is more likely to resemble poetry than physics. 
However, the otherness of transcendence cannot be so otherworldly so as 
to preclude carnal, embodied experience of it in the actual, material world: 
“There must exist a possibility of having an experience of the transcendent 
as such, and unless that possibility exists the word can have no meaning.”21 
This, of course, means that we cannot think clearly about transcendence 
without thinking about the experience of particular people in the particular 
places they inhabit.22 
American thought develops these commitments—against abstraction, for 
embodied experience, and for the relevance of place—in distinctive ways. 
However, given the limitations of space, I will focus on what is perhaps its 
most distinctive characteristic vis-à-vis European thought: the commitment 
to nature, and particularly to “wilderness.”  
III. Thinking Transcendence  
Stylistic diversity and an allergy to abstraction represent points of con-
tact between this type of American philosophy and at least some figures in 
continental philosophy; but the third characteristic I want to highlight is the 
source of a relatively novel contribution, at least for continental thought, to 
our thinking about transcendence. If the first two characteristics together 
suggest that continental philosophy can open itself to American philoso-
phizing in the tradition that flows from Thoreau through Bugbee, Dillard, 
and others, this third characteristic gives us a reason that it should do so. 
21  Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery of Being, vol. 1, Reflection and Mystery, trans. G. S. Fraser 
(London: The Harvill Press, 1951), 46. The need to experience transcendence is not unre-
lated to Kierkegaard’s insistence on the necessity of the incarnation: if God is absolutely 
other than man, then humans cannot encounter or relate to God (cf. the “absolute para-
dox” of The Philosophical Fragments). We can only experience that which is experience-able. 
Of course, for his part, Marcel was still very much committed to a traditional distinction 
between the immanent and the transcendent, one that emphasizes a vertical rather than a 
horizontal “going beyond.” On the other hand, he expressed some reservations about the 
term “trans-ascendence,” used by Jean Wahl and by Levinas (Ibid., 45).
22  Experience is more or less meaningless when “abstracted from intimacy with the lives of 
persons” (Bugbee, Inward Morning, 30). This is because experience is not an object that can be 
held before us in order to be examined. We are caught up in experience, which is less like the 
“absorbing into oneself” of an object, as in the consumption of food, and more like “straining 
oneself towards something, as when, for instance, during the night we attempt to get a dis-
tinct perception of some far-off noise” (Marcel, The Mystery of Being, vol. 1, 47). Thus, while 
Marcel insists on the possibility of experiencing the transcendent, he does not thereby mean 
that the transcendent is comprehensible. The transcendent, by definition, refers to that which 
is beyond: “There is an order where the subject finds himself in the presence of something 
entirely beyond his grasp. I would add that if the word “transcendent” has any meaning it is 
here—it designates the absolute, unbridgeable chasm yawning between the subject and being, 
insofar as being evades every attempt to pin it down” (Marcel, Tragic Wisdom and Beyond, 193). 
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(a) Wilderness 
While Bugbee’s commitment to experience and the concrete shares many 
similarities with Marcel’s, his own philosophy is expressed in a distinctive 
idiom. For Marcel the intersubjective relationship remains his central theme, 
which often, and rightly, draws comparisons between his thinking and the 
thought of Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas. Human relationships play 
the pivotal role in his discussion of presence, reciprocity, creative fidelity, 
mystery, being, and apropos to my theme here, transcendence. This, I’ve 
suggested, is characteristic of a number of philosophers working in the 
continental (European) tradition. 
However, while Bugbee’s philosophy parallels Marcel’s in many ways, 
the dominant motif in his work is not the intersubjective relationship, but 
the experience of wilderness. In this respect Bugbee’s approach draws on 
a tradition that includes Emerson, Thoreau, Muir, and other American 
thinkers more than on Marcel and European philosophy. The framework 
of wilderness gives Bugbee’s thinking a distinctively American tone, one in 
which nature, wilderness, and the West serve as orienting experiences and 
ideas. Marcel himself describes Bugbee as a “man who has been steeped 
in the Far West,” even as he engaged continental European philosophy 
and explored in various ways Zen, Buddhist, and East-West comparative 
philosophy.23 It is this resonance with “the West” that is emblematic of the 
American philosophy I am exploring here, for as Thoreau writes: “The West 
of which I speak is but another name for the Wild.”24
23  Gabriel Marcel, “Introduction to the 1958 Edition” of The Inward Morning, 17. Bugbee’s 
interests in comparative philosophy and Zen gesture toward another characteristic of 
American philosophy: spanning a continent and touching two oceans, the U.S. “faces” Asia 
as much as it does Europe. See also Ed Mooney’s “Introduction” to the same: “Bugbee shows 
us how philosophy consorts with poetry, biography, and history to unveil our worlds, con-
figuring them narratively and imaginatively. His journal anticipates comparative East-West 
philosophy and religion in its attention to doctrines of ‘no-self’ and karma as well as Zen, and 
it is allied to phenomenology and continental philosophy as it intersects American philos-
ophy in the tradition consolidated by Emerson and Thoreau, and sustained by the work of 
John Muir, Aldo Leopold, Rachel Carson, Wallace Stegner and Gary Snyder” (ibid., xx). To 
this I would add the potential for additional fruitful encounters between Bugbee (as well as 
Emerson, Thoreau, Cavell, et al.) and Kohák, Ricoeur, Serres, and other European thinkers.
24  Henry David Thoreau, Walking in The Portable Thoreau (New York: Penguin Books, 
1977), 609. The emphasis on wilderness—especially those manifestations of wilderness 
found out-of-doors, in the woods and mountains—is borne out in various images and tropes 
of wandering, pilgrimage, and travel. This is no doubt in part an artifact of the American 
experience of its western frontier. That American thinking, narrative, and mythology are 
shaped by “wilderness” is not a new claim. See, for example, Roderick Nash’s seminal 
Wilderness and the American Mind (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001). But while 
Nash argues that “wilderness” is an idea, figures like Wallace Stegner argue that the physical 
landscape of the West actually shapes its inhabitants—their aesthetics, their ethics, even their 
metaphysics—in a manner not unrelated to the topic of transcendence. To be of the West 
is to have an appreciation for the “inhuman” scale of nature, both spatial and temporal. 
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But if wilderness is the dominant image and experience in Bugbee’s 
thought—and one prominent in American thought more broadly—we must 
be careful not to read that term in merely literal manner, which would distort 
its full resonance. Wilderness indicates more than vast swaths of terrain 
unpopulated by humans. Bugbee’s wilderness includes such environments 
to be sure, but for him wilderness—or, as Thoreau would have it, wildness—is 
much more commonplace. If wilderness can be found in deep forests, rug-
ged mountains, or stark deserts, it is there paradigmatically, not uniquely. 
Bugbee insists that wilderness is also “close at hand” and it “invites our 
participative response in terms that are everyday.”25 Wilderness is present 
everywhere reality exceeds our grasp—in what we cannot comprehend or, 
better, what we cannot control.26 It is in this manner that Thoreau can find 
“wilderness” in his bean field, just a few miles outside of Concord, and in 
commonplace, even domesticated, animals: a woodchuck, a squirrel, a cow 
leaping over a field fence to escape an enclosure.
It would be impossible to fully unpack the idea of “nature” or “wilder-
ness”—terms that remain hotly contested among environmental philoso-
phers—in so brief an essay. Here, suffice it to say that “wilderness” is in 
its broadest sense the underlying, fundamental reality in which we find 
ourselves; we can be blind to this reality, and certain sorts of environments 
may overlay it in ways that make it more difficult to discern, but it is never 
wholly absent from our experience of the world. 
We might say that wilderness is a manifestation of what Marcel called 
the “mystery of being,” that aspect of reality that we can never fully com-
prehend, both because it is inexhaustible and because we are inextricably 
implaced within it. Mysteries, in Marcel’s sense, are problems that “encroach 
on their own data,” which is another way of articulating the hermeneutic 
The temporal encounter with what is sometimes called “deep time” in the geology of the 
Grand Canyon or Yosemite; and the experience of unbounded space in a land where the 
sky “[comes] clear down to the ground on every side… full of great weathers, and clouds, 
and winds, and hawks,” a land that teaches us something from “looking a long way, from 
looking up, from being much alone” (Wallace Stegner, “The Wilderness Letter” in The Sound 
of Mountain Water [New York: Penguin, 1980], 152). This appreciation for “the inhuman” is 
evident in many thinkers of the American West, but is perhaps most powerfully present in 
the poetry of Robinson Jeffers. 
25  Edward  Mooney, “Introduction” to The Inward Morning, xi. This commitment to the 
everyday is broadly evident in American thinking. “No ideas but in things,” wrote William 
Carlos Williams in Paterson I, an American poet who consciously chose to stay Stateside 
and plumb the depths of an apparently unexceptional small city, rather than follow the 
pattern of T.S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, and others by moving to Europe. Nevertheless, despite 
his commitment to wilderness in the everyday, Bugbee’s own journal is distinctly oriented 
toward paradigmatic examples of wilderness. His is a “philosophy of the open air,” to use 
Marcel’s characterization (Gabriel Marcel, “Introduction to the 1958 Edition” of The Inward 
Morning, 26).
26  Thus, Michel Serres’s emphasis on “the hard” is surely an aspect of wildness. See 
note 29.
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insight that we never occupy a “view from nowhere” from which we can 
experience the totality objectively.27 For this reason, mysteries, unlike prob-
lems, are not aporia we aim to eliminate or solve. They are, rather, realities 
we experience and attempt, imperfectly, to understand.
To express this in yet another vocabulary, one more congenial to main-
stream continental thought, we might say that wilderness is a condition 
characterized by an irreducible otherness.28 This is because mysteries con-
front us with a reality in which we are inextricably involved but which 
exceeds us on all sides and which resists, in varying ways and degrees, 
assimilation into the comfortable sphere of the same. We participate in 
wilderness, we are immersed in and present to it; but it always exceeds 
and in some sense resists us.29 
(b) Contact
In 1846, in the middle of his two-year retreat at Walden Pond and seeking 
an even more direct experience of wilderness, Henry David Thoreau set 
out on a journey to the Maine woods with the goal of climbing the remote 
Mount Ktaadn. He believed, echoing Melville and Nietzsche, that “the 
tops of mountains are among the unfinished [i.e., wild] parts of the globe, 
whither it is a slight insult to the gods to climb and pry into their secrets, 
and try their effect on our humanity. Only daring and insolent men, per-
chance, go there.”30 On Ktaadn, Thoreau found what he was looking for: 
wildness that struck him with wonder and fear, the full range and measure 
of mysterium tremendum et fascinans.
On the ascent, caught in poor weather, Thoreau experienced wilderness 
as alien and threatening: “[Here, Nature] does not smile on [humanity] 
as in the plains. She seems to say sternly, why came ye here before your 
time? This ground is not prepared for you…Why seek me where I have not 
called thee, and then complain because you find me but a stepmother?”31 
27  Marcel, On the Ontological Mystery, 19.
28  On the connection between mystery and otherness, see my Aspects of Alterity (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2006).
29  The image of a phenomenon that “resists” us is one that evokes not only “otherness,” 
including the “inhuman scale” of Stegner’s West, but also Michel Serres’s account of “the 
hard” (le dur). Hard reality is that reality to which we must accommodate ourselves, as 
opposed to soft (le doux) reality that we are able to bend to our needs or wants. Wildness is a 
way of speaking about those aspects of the world that resist our control, phenomena to which 
we must conform rather than bending them to our will. True, there are aspects of reality that 
remain “wild” in even the most advanced urban centers. Earthquakes, droughts, the coyotes 
and mountain lions that cling tenaciously to their homes in the local mountains—all this 
wildness exists right in the heart of Los Angeles, where I work. Nevertheless, it is difficult 
to deny that human beings exert much more control over their surroundings in Paris than 
they do on the Patagonian icecap or the Artic National Wildlife Refuge.
30  Henry David Thoreau, The Maine Woods (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2004), 65.
31  Thoreau, The Maine Woods, 64
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However, his reflections on the descent call into question his initial reaction 
to the alien otherness of the wild: 
we have not seen pure Nature, unless we have seen her thus vast, and 
drear, and inhuman, though in the midst of cities. Nature was here some-
thing savage and awful, though beautiful. I looked with awe at the ground 
I trod on…. What is it to be admitted to a museum, to see a myriad 
of particular things, compared with being shown some star’s surface, 
some hard matter in its home! …Talk of mysteries! – Think of our life in 
nature, – daily to be shown matter, to come in contact with it, – rocks, 
trees, wind on our cheeks! the solid earth! the actual world! the common 
sense! Contact! Contact!32
Thoreau wants to experience the “mystery,” whether that mystery proves 
to be “mean” or “sublime.” As he says of his retreat to Walden Pond: 
I went to the woods because I wished to live deliberately, to front only the 
essential facts of life, and see if I could not learn what it had to teach, and 
not, which I came to die, discover that I had not lived. I did not wish to live 
what was not life, living is so dear; nor did I wish to practice resignation, 
unless it was quite necessary. I wanted to live deep and suck out all the 
marrow of life, to live so sturdily and Spartan-like as to put to rout all 
that was not life, to cut a broad swath and shave close, to drive life into 
a corner, and reduce it to its lowest terms, and, if it proved to be mean, 
why then to get the whole and genuine meanness of it, and publish its 
meanness to the world; or if it were sublime, to know it by experience, 
and be able to give a true account of it in my next excursion.33
Thoreau also wants “transcendence” of a sort; but he is committed to 
the idea that it can only be found in immanence: “Contact! Contact!” Here 
it is precisely the density, hardness, and otherness of things that gives rise 
to their transcendence, and to our experience of transcendence. Eternity in 
the everyday.
If “wilderness” and “wildness” are, in part, ways of talking about other-
ness, it is in the context of an otherness that is, as John D. Caputo claims, the 
way in which continental philosophy speaks of “the real.”34 Wilderness—
which is beyond our comprehension, and resists our attempts to pin it down, 
fix, or control it—is reality which we cannot ultimately escape, reality to 
which we must accommodate ourselves rather than reality that we bend 
to our will and shape to suit our wants. It is an aspect of “the real” that we 
can try to ignore or elide, but which we can never fully escape and therefore 
must take into account. 
32  Thoreau, The Maine Woods, 71. 
33  Henry David Thoreau, Walden (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 90-91.
34  John D. Caputo, The Insistence of God (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
2013), 181. 
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Clearly this resonates with the thinkers I am describing. For his part, 
Thoreau is quite explicit:
Let us settle ourselves, and work and wedge our feet downward through 
the mud and slush of opinion, and prejudice, and tradition, and delusion, 
and appearance, that alluvion which covers the globe, through Paris and 
London, through New York and Boston and Concord, through church 
and state, through poetry and philosophy and religion, till we come to a 
hard bottom and rocks in place, which we can call reality, and say, This 
is, and no mistake…35
And Bugbee adds: “I want neither objectivism nor subjectivism… but 
realism.”36 But the “realism” toward which we are groping here is not one 
that is susceptible to a reductive materialism or a facile positivism. It is, 
rather, a commitment to the real and to immanence in a manner that, pre-
cisely, opens us to the experience of transcendence. 
Only as things are dense and opaque do they stand forth in the light of 
eternity, and take the light. To take that which exists as existing, and not 
as a symbol for something else; to find something to which someone gives 
full heed, and not merely to push right through it in search of a beyond, 
or to have from it only a message at once directing the mind away from 
it and on to other things; such is the experience of things as eternal…37 
So the realism at stake here is precisely one that unfolds toward—or, 
better, into—the transcendent. Not the transcendence of another world 
beyond the world, but another world within the world. 
Here we might take a cue from a philosopher who was American by cir-
cumstance rather than birth, a European expatriate who was educated and 
spent much of his professional life in the United States before returning to 
the Czech Republic: Erazim Kohák. Kohák draws a distinction between two 
overlapping but distinct orders—the order of temporality and the order of 
value. The order of temporality is one that we experience in largely causal 
terms, one which connects the present to the past from which it came and the 
future into which it will flow. In the order of time, we work and plan, calculate 
and accumulate. This despite the fact that such planning cannot prevent loss 
in the flow of time, “where moth and decay destroy, and thieves break in and 
steal” (Matthew 6:19). In contrast, the order of value is revealed when we 
glimpse the present moment “not in its relation to what preceded and what 
will follow it, but in its absolute being—in its relation to what, clumsily, we 
describe as eternity.”38 Here calculation is impossible, because what is given 
35  Henry David Thoreau, Walden in The Portable Thoreau (New York: Penguin Books, 
1977), 350. 
36  Bugbee, Inward Morning, 168. 
37  Bugbee, Inward Morning, 163. 
38  Kohák, The Embers and the Stars, 82.
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exceeds our capacity to receive it. As Nicolas Bouvier comments, reflecting on 
one such experience during a cold sunrise on a remote and lonely road east 
of Erzurum: “In the end, the bedrock of existence is not made up of family, 
or work, or what others say or think of you, but of moments like this when 
you are exalted by a transcendent power that is more serene than love. Life 
dispenses them parsimoniously; our feeble hearts could not stand more.”39 
In such moments, even the hardest of hard realities—our finitude and 
mortality—become “a matter of indifference.”40 Far from the inauthentic 
flight from our being-toward-death that so fascinates the early Heidegger, 
these moments represent the full assumption—whether conscious or not—
of our creatureliness.41 The finitude and frailty of the moment into which 
eternity breaks—this particular landscape, these ephemeral conditions, this 
mortal participant—enhance rather than detract from the phenomenon and 
the experience of it. In such moments, life “superlives.”42 The sufficiency, 
the plenitude, of such moments is the effect of eternity erupting in the flow 
of the temporal: the extraordinary in the ordinary, heaven on Earth. And 
while, absent additional faith commitments that would require a move 
beyond a phenomenology of experience into a theological eschatology, 
these experiences cannot quite bring us to “mock” the victory of death in 
the order of temporality, attending to these experiences can certainly lessen 
or remove death’s “sting” (cf. 1 Corinthians 15:55). In such moments, we 
come to recognize and appreciate the fundamental goodness of being, and, 
with Mrs. Ramsey of Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse, to believe and to 
feel, that “it [the glimpse of eternity in the everyday] is enough.”43 
39  Nicolas Bouvier, The Way of the World, trans. Robyn Marsack (New York: New York 
Review of Books Classics, 2009), 95.
40  Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, Volume VI: Time Regained, trans. Andreas Mayor 
and Terence Kilmartin (New York: The Modern Library, 2003), 257. This is the calmness 
amidst the uncertainty and, indeed, the chaos and brutality of life (i.e., wildness) that 
Melville’s Ishmael describes: “…amid the tornadoed Atlantic of my being, do I myself still 
for ever disport in mute calm; and while ponderous planets of unwavering woe revolve 
round me, deep down and deep inland there I still bathe me in eternal mildness of joy” 
(Herman Melville, Moby Dick [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988], 399).
41  Here we might find a point of connection between more traditional religious accounts 
of transcendence and the tradition running through Thoreau, Bugbee, and others. Recent 
thinking in the Catholic Church has foregrounded the problems associated with losing sight 
of our creatureliness. To my mind, this is the central message of Laudato Si’. Climate change 
and other environmental injustices are terrible phenomena; but, in the end, they are really just 
symptoms of a deeper spiritual illness having to do with our desire to “be like gods” (Genesis 
3:5) and to deny our creatureliness. An excellent bridge between a kind of Thoreauvian 
emphasis on our animality and a Catholic-Franciscan emphasis on our creatureliness might 
be found in the writing of Annie Dillard (Pilgrim at Tinker Creek, Holy the Firm, etc.). 
42  Michel Serres, Variations on the Body, trans. Randolph Burks (London: Continuum, 
2008), 15-16.
43  Virginia Woolf, To the Lighthouse (Dublin: Roads Publishing, 2013), 73. Woolf, at times 
an aggressive atheist, nevertheless described such moments as “partaking in eternity” 
throughout To the Lighthouse. 
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(c) Wandering and Wondering 
But eternity breaking into the everyday is not something we experience 
simply by walking out the door, nor is it, strictly speaking, something we 
can accomplish through our efforts. Rather, it is something more or less out 
of our control, which is why wildness is, on some level, the appropriate 
metaphor. It is something for which we can, at best, put ourselves on alert, 
increasing the chances that when the doors of perception swing open we 
will be properly oriented to step through. For the thinkers we have been 
considering—committed in various ways to realism, sensuous experience, 
and material place—transcendence unfolds not because we escape one 
place for another, but rather because we see the places we already inhabit 
with “new eyes.”44 
We accomplish this, first by exposing ourselves to the wilderness and, 
second, by letting go of our desire to dominate or domesticate it.
Thoreau claimed to suffer from spiritual and physical malaise if he failed 
to attend to his daily walks through the woods around Concord, which often 
occupied four or more hours of his day.45 He referred to these outings as 
“sauntering,” the meaning of which he linked, tellingly, both to saint terre 
(holy land) and to sans terre (without a land or home). This spiritual exer-
cise was one of the primary means by which he immersed himself in and 
experienced wildness, whether those treks were on paths around Concord 
or deep in the Maine woods.46
For Thoreau, sauntering was more than just walking from place to place; 
it was a process of stepping away from society and of losing oneself so that 
nature, wildness, could show itself and speak. When we walk, we aim to 
get somewhere, and so we choose a destination, make plans, chart a course, 
and forge ahead. But when we saunter we aim not to get somewhere else, 
but to be more fully where we already are: “It is no use to direct our steps 
to the woods if they do not carry us thither. I am alarmed when it happens 
that I have walked a mile into the woods bodily, without getting there 
in spirit.”47 In the village—to say nothing of the city—we see ourselves, 
humanity, reflected back at us from every direction. Here man is not only 
44  As Thoreau says, “There is just as much beauty visible to us in the landscape as we 
are prepared to appreciate, —not a grain more” (Henry David Thoreau, Autumnal Tints 
[Bedford, MA: Applewood Books, 1996], 58). Here again Kazantzakis appears to agree with 
Thoreau, Dillard, et al: “Since we cannot change reality, let us change the eyes which see 
reality” (Kazantzakis, Report to Greco, 45). 
45  For other accounts of walking philosophers, see Frédéric Gros, A Philosophy of Walking, 
trans. John Howe (London: Verso, 2014).
46  I do not mean to impute to Thoreau any orthodox religious commitments; he grew to 
bristle at Unitarian orthodoxy, and it is difficult to know whether one should classify him as 
a Deist, a pantheist, or something else entirely. Nevertheless, he clearly falls into religious 
categories in the sense in which they are often used philosophically by figures like John D. 
Caputo, Richard Kearney, and others.
47  Thoreau, Walking, 597.
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the measure, but also the architect, of all things. And, as Blake points out, 
“he who sees only the Ratio sees himself only,” while “he who sees the 
infinite in all things sees God.”48 True, there is wildness, otherness, even 
in the city; but that mystery is more apparent and more accessible when 
we step outside, away from climate-controlled environments and cornuco-
pian dining tables, away from the security and shelter of home, away from 
well-ordered and policed society. 
The saunterer declines to impose her will on the process, and allows the 
environment—the weather, the topography, the flora and fauna that share 
the landscape—to direct her steps: “I believe there is a subtle magnetism 
in Nature, which, if we unconsciously yield to it, will direct us aright.”49 
This mysterious beckoning was, for Thoreau, Bugbee, Muir, and others 
gravitationally aligned with  “the West”—that is, away from ordered and 
domesticated society and toward wildness, otherness, mystery. Thoreau 
likens his peregrinations to the unknown paths of non-returning comets 
and to the mysterious rhythms of migrations, the latter—bison, salmon, 
baleen whales—so deeply emblematic of the American West. It would not 
be an overstatement to suggest that, for this stream of American thought, 
philosophy begins in wander.50
The homelessness of such wandering is not that of certain medieval 
pilgrims, who walked on pilgrimage as if the Earth were merely a bus 
stop en route to paradise, a world into which we were exiled when we 
were expelled from our true home. The homeless of sauntering—which 
Thoreau likens to being at home “everywhere,” that is, in nature—serves 
to remind us that “there is more in heaven and earth than is dreamt of in 
our philosophies,” or in our politics, economics, and sciences. It reminds 
us to give thanks for the gift and goodness of the greater whole of which 
we are a part, even if aspects of that mystery’s whole are terrifying, rather 
than resting comfortably in well-worn surroundings in which mystery is 
(relatively) absent. But the otherness of the wilderness can never be abso-
lute, even in a storm on the summit of Mount Ktaadn, because wilderness 
is the condition of a world in which we are also at home, a world to which 
we belong.51
But we must do more than “wander” to experience transcendence; the 
classical philosophical commitment to “wonder” retains a central place in 
this tradition as well. “Nature,” writes Annie Dillard, “is very much a now-
48  William Blake, There Is No Natural Religion. Note that the “series a” and “series b” 
versions of the etching plates seem to suggest diametrically opposed views with respect to 
human knowledge, “series a” being committed to a thoroughgoing empiricism and “series 
b” criticizing the limitations of empiricism. 
49  Thoreau, Walking, 602.
50  In its own way a sentiment not far from the perspective associated with Marcel’s 
treatment of man as homo viator (Gabriel Marcel, Homo Viator, trans. Emma Crawford [New 
York: Harper and Row, 1965]).
51  See, for example, Gary Snyder, The Practice of the Wild (Counterpoint, 2010), 31.
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you-see-it, now-you-don’t affair.”52 Our experience of it is that of a world 
concealing, revealing, and concealing itself again. Transcendence, eternity 
in the everyday, is possible anywhere and at any time; but one must be, 
as it were, on alert. Otherwise, like the brief incandescence of a shooting 
star, we miss it.
Having left the relatively ordered and controlled environment of the city 
or town for a path and the open sky, and having given up a rigid agenda 
about where one is going and how one will get there, it still remains to 
saunter with a wakeful disposition, to use another of Thoreau’s favorite 
tropes. Alertness to the possibility of transcendence requires that we “let 
be” the things of the world so that they can show themselves to us; and it 
requires that we “let go” of our own attempts to impose meaning on them, 
that we listen rather than dictate.53
Later in life, Thoreau became more and more interested in science, and 
spent most of his time in painstaking observation and documentation of 
the environment around Concord. However, he recognized that even the 
relatively hands-on science of his day was steering him perilously close 
to something like the spirit of abstraction; and he struggled to reconcile 
what we might call his earlier poetic and even mystical tendencies with his 
growing commitment to empiricism. At stake in this tension is the distinc-
tion between what Dillard thinks of as two types of seeing. The first type 
of seeing is one tied up with verbalization. This seeing pays close attention, 
observes, describes, analyzes; and it is important. But there is a second sort 
of seeing, which reveals something obscured by the first, and which involves 
not effort, but letting go.54 
Dillard recounts a tale of a girl, blind from birth or a very young age, 
who, on having her sight restored, described a tree as “full of light,” delight-
ing in the beauty and wonder and extravagance of the illuminated world.55 
Dillard herself works at trying to see the world with this kind of wonder 
and gratitude, in which “the whole world sparks and flames.”56 But she 
52  Annie Dillard, Pilgrim at Tinker Creek (New York: Harper Perennial, 1964), 18.
53  On this point, see Michel Serres, Biogea, trans. Randolph Burkes (Univocal, 2012).
54  The similarities to Proust, as well as to Taoist thinking about wu-wei, are obvious. 
“The only true voyage, the only bath in the Fountain of Youth, would be not to visit strange 
lands but to possess other eyes, to see the universe through the eyes of another, of a hun-
dred others, to see the hundred universes that each of them sees, that each of them is; and 
this we can do with and Elstir, with a Vinteuil; with men like these we really do fly from 
star to star” (Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, Volume V: The Captive and The Fugitive, 
trans. Andreas Mayor and Terence Kilmartin [New York: The Modern Library, 2003], 343). 
Proust’s suggestion that “new eyes” are more important than “new landscapes” is, in fact, 
not far at all from Thoreau, who once observed: “I have traveled a great deal in Concord” 
(Thoreau, Walden, 4). The idea that one could “travel a great deal” in the immediate environs 
of one New England village suggests that Thoreau’s travels, and his wilderness, is internal 
as much as external. 
55  Dillard, Pilgrim at Tinker Creek, 31.
56  Dillard, Pilgrim at Tinker Creek, 11. 
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eventually discovers that such understanding never fully comes from 
trying or committing oneself to painstaking observation; rather, it comes 
unbidden when one is not trying, when one empties oneself and lets go. 
This glimpse of transcendence is “always, even to the most practiced and 
adept, a gift and a total surprise… I cannot cause light; the most I can do 
is try to put myself in the path of its beam.”57 It is only after coming to 
understand this second sort of seeing that Dillard eventually sees, on one 
of her own walks beside Tinker Creek, a cedar tree “transfigured, each cell 
buzzing with flame.”58 
This is perhaps not unlike the experience of seeing the world both “as if 
for the first time” and “as if for the last time,” as recommended by Pierre 
Hadot.59 To see “as if for the first time” is to see with innocent eyes. Not in 
the sense that the seeing is non-hermeneutic—a “view from nowhere”—but 
rather in the sense of seeing as a child does: with wonder. “A world with 
dew still on it,” as Stegner had it.60 Seeing “as if for the last time” requires 
that we recognize both our transience and transience the things we experi-
ence. This gives rise to the melancholy pathos of mono no aware or lacrimae 
rerum, which, seen with the new eyes of transcendence, clarifies and mag-
nifies the utter gratuity of the goodness of being rather than distorting or 
detracting from it. 
When Dillard finally learns to empty herself and to let go, accommodat-
ing herself to the second sort of seeing, she writes that she found herself 
“ringing” or resonating with reality: “I had been my whole life a bell, and 
never known until at that moment I was lifted and struck.”61 If there is a 
unity among the transcendentals, as the medievals maintained, we should 
remember that it is often beauty that leads us to the good and the true, 
rather than the true or the good leading us to the beautiful.
*
57  Dillard, Pilgrim at Tinker Creek, 35. Admittedly this is in tension with both Thoreau’s 
near-obsessive dedication to collecting, categorizing, and describing facts related to his 
environs, and with modern environmental philosophers like Holmes Rolston III, who 
suggest that scientific understanding of the natural world helps us to see not only its truth 
but also its beauty. 
58  Dillard, Pilgrim at Tinker Creek, 36. This is reminiscent of William Blake’s childhood 
vision of “a tree filled with angels, bright angelic wings bespangling every bough like 
stars.”
59  See The Present Alone is Our Happiness, trans. Marc Djaballah (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2011), and Philosophy as a Way of Life (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 1995).
60  Wallace Stegner, “Haunted by Waters: Norman Maclean” in Where the Bluebird Sings to 
the Lemonade Springs (New York: The Modern Library, 1992), 192. Or perhaps a non-comical 
version of Miranda’s “O wonder! / How many goodly creatures are there here! / How beau-
teous mankind is! O brave new world, / That has such people in’t” (William Shakespeare, 
“The Tempest,” Act V, Scene I).
61  Dillard, Pilgrim at Tinker Creek, 36.
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There are, no doubt, other more domesticated ways of experiencing tran-
scendence in the ordinary: Proust’s petit phrase of Vinteuil or his stumble on 
the cobblestones outside the Guermantes’ mansion, Mrs. Ramsey’s dinner 
party in Woolf’s masterpiece, and other similar experiences. But American 
philosophy in the tradition of Thoreau, Bugbee, and their heirs is attracted to 
wilderness precisely because we can relate to it as both realists and mystics, 
as empiricists and poets. In the wilderness we find a mystery that is rooted 
in what Serres calls “hard” reality, but in a manner that nonetheless some-
how opens or reveals a depth that surpasses the kinds of understanding 
we normally associate with the hard. 
Likewise, individual faith may still hope for other forms of trans-ascen-
dence; but such speculation ought not distract us from the transcendence 
to which we do have access, here and now: the heaven outside our doors. 
When Thoreau was on his deathbed, forty-four years old and suffering 
from tuberculosis, Parker Pilsbury is said to have broached the subject 
of transcendence in terms of another world: “You seem so near the brink 
of the dark river, I almost know the opposite shore may appear to you.” 
Thoreau is said to have smiled and gently rebuked his friend: “One world 
at a time…”62
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